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Chapter 2
Achieving Anti-fragility
A stakeholder is a person or institution with a legitimate interest in a given information
and communications technology (ICT) system. Examples of stakeholders are users,
owners, operators, regulatory government agencies, system architects, and software
developers. Given a set of stakeholders, a complex adaptive ICT system is fragile
to a particular type of negative impact, for example, downtime, if a possible large
impact is unacceptable to some stakeholders in the set and robust if all possible
impacts are acceptable to all stakeholders. The ICT system is anti-fragile if it learns
(perhaps with help from some stakeholders) to maintain an acceptable impact to all
stakeholders as the system and environment change over time.
This chapter first considers rare failures causing unacceptable impact and argues
that it is very hard to predict all such future events. Second, it argues that it is necessary
to limit the impact of failures to gain robustness and to learn from the remaining small
failures to achieve anti-fragility. Third, the chapter discusses limitations of classical
risk analysis methods before finally introducing an alternative definition of risk in
complex adaptive ICT systems.
2.1 Black and Gray Swans
As stated in Chap. 1, global emergent behaviors of complex adaptive systems are
modeled as stochastic events with given probability distributions. For simplicity, we
assume that the studied behavior of a system is modeled by a continuous random
variable with a distribution given by a probability density function (PDF). Figure 2.1
shows two PDFs, each with a left and right tail. The tails determine the probability of
outliers in the form of extreme global behavior. The left tail defines the probabilities
of outliers with huge negative impact, while the right tail defines the probabilities of
outliers with huge positive impact. We are only concerned with negative impact in
this book.
As illustrated in Fig. 2.1, there are PDFs with thin tails and thick (or fat) tails. If a
PDF has thin tails, then most events occur close to the mean of the PDF. Furthermore,
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Fig. 2.1 Two PDFs, one with thin tails and one with thick tails
Fig. 2.2 Probability and negative impact of a single nonrecurrent swan incident versus recurrent
incidents. The swan is an outlier
outliers far from the mean have such low probabilities that they can be ignored
for all practical purposes. This is the case for the thin-tailed bell curve (or normal
distribution). However, if a PDF has thick tails, then the probabilities of the outliers
are too large to be ignored. Observe that a PDF can also have one thick tail and one
thin tail.
Large man-made systems designed in a top-down manner by successively being
broken down into smaller parts tend to have global behaviors whose probabilities
are defined by PDFs with thick left tails. In general, the thick tails are due to posi-
tive feedback loops created by a series of interacting processes that together result in
systems adapting to the effect of their previous behaviors (see Fig. 1.2). Positive feed-
back loops allow for outliers with unacceptable impact [3, 4]. Taleb [9] distinguishes
between two types of outliers with negative impact, namely, black and gray swans.
Figure 2.2 depicts the differences in probability and impact between a nonrecurrent
black or gray swan and so-called normal, recurrent incidents: Both types of swans
are surprising outliers, falsifying previous assumptions about the negative impact of
incidents made by most or all stakeholders of a system.
Assume an arbitrary but fixed set of stakeholders. A black swan is a metaphor for
rare global behavior of a complex adaptive system whose huge negative impact comes
as a total surprise to all stakeholders in the set. This type of extreme emergent behavior
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is the “unknown unknown,” a rare bombshell event that none of the stakeholders have
considered.
Two important observations can be made about black swans. First, a black swan
cannot be described by any of the stakeholders because the event is completely
unknown to all of them. Second, while a black swan is a total surprise to all the
stakeholders considered, there may be other individuals outside the group of stake-
holders for which the event is not a big surprise. As an example, while the economic
crisis of 2007/2008 came as a huge surprise to most people, a few individuals, includ-
ing Taleb [9], foresaw the crisis, even though they could not say when the crisis would
occur or exactly how serious the consequences would be.
A gray swan is a metaphor for rare global behavior with a large negative impact
that is somewhat predictable but typically overlooked by most of the stakeholders
considered. It is the “known unknown,” a rare event that some know is possible but
no one knows when or whether it will occur. Because a gray swan is not a complete
surprise to all stakeholders, it tends to have less impact than a black swan. However,
its impact is still huge. For simplicity, we often neglect to define a set of stakeholders
when we discuss gray and black swans. However, the reader should assume that
users, owners, software developers, operators, and regulatory government agencies
are always among the stakeholders.
2.2 Examples of Swans
Hindsight bias, or the knew-it-all-along effect, is the natural tendency, after an inci-
dent has occurred, to conclude that the incident was foreseeable, despite there hav-
ing been little or no objective basis for this conclusion. Hindsight bias [6, 9] causes
observers to miscategorize black swans as gray swans after the fact. Moreover, dif-
ferences in understanding, personal involvement, and available information cause
individuals to disagree on whether a large-impact event is a black or gray swan at
all. Consequently, it is hard to make all observers agree on what incidents are gray
and black swans in complex ICT systems, especially when the observers have no
access to the stakeholders. We can, however, give examples of incidents that many,
but perhaps not all, security experts will categorize as swans.
When the computer worm Nimda first appeared on the Internet in September
2001, it spread quickly, causing hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, accord-
ing to press reports. Although the public was familiar with worms at the time, we
characterize Nimda as a black swan because it was the first infectious malware
with multiple attack methods [30]. Nimda’s five attack methods made it extremely
difficult to foresee all of their consequences. The large number of infected com-
puters demonstrates that the attacks surprised computer owners, software vendors,
and information technology departments. While NIMDA caused much damage, it
could have been much worse. The worm occurred only one week after the 9/11
terrorist attacks. According to Geer [30], the backdoor installed by NIMDA could
have been exploited to run denial-of-service attacks on emergency services all over
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the United States, causing public loss of confidence after the nationwide uncertainty
created by the shock of 9/11.
In August 2001, a company providing services to Norwegian banks installed
new disks in a backup system used to mirror the production environment. System
operators inadvertently routed the instruction to format the disks to the production
environment rather than to the backup system. The error rendered production data
inaccessible on about 280 disks, thus halting the production environment. This rare
incident affected 114 banks and roughly 1 million users. It took seven days before
payment card, ATM, Internet banking, and phone banking services were all back to
normal operation. While the total cost to the company is not publicly known, it was
likely very large, since the company had to compensate the banks for their financial
losses. This gray swan occurred because administrators did not pay enough attention
to the established security procedures and thus triggered a single point of failure in
the system.
While we should always try to remove single points of failures from ICT systems,
there exist systems for which a single point of failure is an essential side effect of
the design [30]. The single red phone on the American president’s desk is a good
example. Many red phones would be a far worse solution from a risk management
point of view. When a single point of failure is a design requirement, we need to
deploy defense in depth, which is not a research-grade problem. Hence, we will not
discuss single points of failure in any detail in this book.
2.3 Limiting the Impact of Failures
To understand the challenges of curbing the impact of failures in complex ICT sys-
tems, we study why it is so hard to predict rare events with large negative impacts [9,
34]. Let the term incident denote an event with negative impact. To predict any future
incident, we must describe the incident, estimate its probability, and calculate the
impact. Many incidents causing, for example, unplanned downtime are predictable,
especially incidents due to single points of failure. As an example, ICT systems with-
out redundant data storage or backup power are sure to fail sooner or later. However,
swan incidents exist that are very hard or even impossible to predict.
In fact, it is very hard to accurately predict extreme global behavior in complex
ICT systems [7, 34]. Because the systems have too many dynamic interactions for
humans to even enumerate all the possible scenarios leading to outliers with a huge
negative impact, it is easy for all stakeholders to overlook a future swan, thus making
it black. Furthermore, it is hard to estimate the probabilities of identified gray swans,
because a complex system changes significantly and perhaps abruptly over time and
because a system’s recorded history might not contain a single swan; for example, a
100-year flood is not likely to show up in 10 years of historical data.
Complex systems’ lack of well-defined boundaries makes it hard to build models
to accurately estimate the probabilities of gray swans. Taleb utilizes power laws to
illustrate that small model errors greatly affect rare events’ estimated probabilities
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[11]. Experience with a particular system type helps estimate gray swan probabilities
in a similar new system. However, because the estimation of gray swan probabili-
ties in a large system requires many assumptions, especially when considering the
design of a system that has not yet been implemented, the estimates carry significant
uncertainty. All in all, it is very hard for stakeholders to accurately predict the gray
swans that actually occur. In addition, even if a system owner mitigates all the gray
swans, an unknown black swan can still cause huge damage.
Since the probability of each black and gray swan is both small and unknown,
it is tempting to ignore swans altogether. However, because a complex ICT system
is typically vulnerable to many swans, there is a significant probability that at least
one swan will occur. Thus, no matter the quality of the risk analysis, swans causing
unacceptable impact will occur in complex ICT systems sooner or later; unless the
systems are especially designed and operated to limit the impact of rare, unforesee-
able events [3, 4, 6, 10].
To avoid surprising outliers and help ensure event distributions with thin left tails,
Chap. 4 proposes four design principles to isolate local failures affecting small parts
of systems, thus preventing them from propagating into systemic or global failures
affecting complete systems.
2.4 Learning from Small Failures
In an interesting monograph, Sidney Dekker [17] recounts series of small, rather
insignificant everyday decisions leading to major disasters, including large oil spills
and plane crashes. There are no easily detectable properties of the decisions that signal
major disasters in the future. In fact, given the information available at the time, most
of the decisions are reasonable when studied in isolation. However, over time, the
decisions reduced the diversity and redundancy of the systems and made them steadily
more fragile to disasters. This fragilizing process was mainly driven by pressure to use
fewer resources and to produce results faster. Some stakeholders contributed to the
system fragility by introducing conflicting requirements and regulations, while other
stakeholders encouraged risky behavior to reach certain goals, such as producing
large quantities of oil.
The accident scenarios described by Dekker [17] further demonstrate that broken
parts are not the major reason for disasters in complex adaptive systems. Rather,
it is the stakeholders’ inability to cope with the complexity of a system and its
changing environment. Lack of understanding, insufficient communication between
stakeholders, and pressure to improve a system’s “efficiency” all increase its fragility
to disasters. Dekker shows how stakeholders build and operate systems they do not
fully understand. While stakeholders grasp the functionality of each part, the huge
amount of interactions between the many parts and the changing rules and regulations
governing the operations of the systems make it impossible for stakeholders to prevent
rare catastrophic events.
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In summary, man-made complex systems in general and complex ICT systems
in particular tend to drift into systemic failure because they become increasingly
fragile due to internal and external changes. The drift occurs slowly, with few or
no obvious indications of increased fragility before a major incident occurs [2, 17,
35]. Since black and gray swans in complex systems limit the stakeholders’ ability
to predict extreme global behavior with a huge negative impact, the stakeholders
must analyze local failures (with limited impact) and introduce countermeasures to
avoid increased fragility due to local failures propagating into global failures. Daniel
Kahneman’s pioneering work [36] and a monograph by Michael T. Nygard [35]
confirm the discussed limits of prediction and the need to learn from local failures.
Since the capacity to detect small failures is crucial to determine vulnerabilities, the
comprehensive monitoring of a system’s behavior is extremely important to achieve
anti-fragility. The goal is not to prevent all failures in an ICT system but to avoid
silent failures and quickly start necessary repairs.
Because systemic failures are most often, but not always, initiated by local failures
that propagate due to positive feedback loops, it is possible to prevent many swans by
detecting local failures and preventing them from propagating. While all swans may
not be absolutely prevented, it is possible to make rare events rarer and reduce their
impact. Chapter 4 proposes an operational principle that induces artificial failures
into a system to quickly detect vulnerabilities with the potential to cause systemic
failures. A team of experts with diverse skill sets should learn from the induced
incidents because a team could respond faster and gain more insights than a single
individual. All team members should have “skin in the game” [10, Chap. 23]: When
the members face the consequences of their actions and suffer failure as well as enjoy
success, they become motivated to learn rapidly and not take unwarranted chances.
A team of software developers has skin in the game when it is responsible for both
the development and operations (DevOps) of its software [37, 38]. Another way of
introducing skin in the game is to let team members use their own software as much
as possible.
The increasingly popular DevOps methodology emphasizes communication, col-
laboration, and integration between software developers and information technology
operations professionals. DevOps is a response to the interdependence of software
development and information technology operations. It facilitates learning from nat-
ural and induced failures and encourages software developers to create robust code
so they do not have to fix problems at three o’clock in the morning.
2.5 An Alternative Justification
We have argued that a complex ICT system exposed to swan incidents must be anti-
fragile to the swans’ impacts to thrive over time. According to Taleb [10], the need for
anti-fragility can be summarized as follows: Let X be a random variable representing
events with some probability distribution (given by a PDF) and let h(X) be another
random variable representing the possible impacts, for example, the financial costs
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to a stakeholder. In practice, we care about h(X) and not X . While it is often hard to
change the thick-tail distribution of X , it can be much easier to change the distribution
of h(X). Our goal is to ensure that the distribution of h(X) has a thin left tail to avoid
intolerable costly outliers (see Fig. 2.2).
Since a complex adaptive system and its environment change over time, perhaps
abruptly, the distribution of h(X) also changes. The left tail of the changing distrib-
ution of h(X) is unknown because we do not have sufficient data, that is, the history
of the system may not contain any outliers and, even if it did, there is no guarantee
that the future of the system will be anything like its past. Hence, an anti-fragile
system must prevent local failures from propagating into systemic failures and use
local failures to detect and remove vulnerabilities that can lead to systemic failures
in the future.
While the discussed approach leads to a thinning of the left tail of h(X), there is no
absolute guarantee that a swan will not occur in a complex ICT system. Guaranteed
swan-free ICT systems can only be achieved by keeping the systems relatively small
to limit their importance and possible negative impact. It may also be necessary to
isolate systems from each other, for example, systems with particularly sensitive
information should not be connected to the Internet.
2.6 Risk Analyses Ignore Swans
The reader may wonder how classical methods for the risk analysis of ICT systems
rate the impact of swans. The short answer is that they mostly ignore swans altogether.
This unfortunate tendency partly explains why we continue building ICT systems
with tightly interconnected parts, little diversity, and low redundancy that allow local
failures to propagate into systemic failures.
Traditionally, analysts evaluate risk by estimating the probability of a threat
exploiting a vulnerability and by determining the resulting incident’s negative impact.
Analysts often use the values low, medium, and high to approximate the probability
and impact, resulting in the five-level risk matrix in Fig. 2.3. The matrix incorrectly
classifies a gray swan as a medium risk because it has a low probability and high
impact according to the approximations.
As an example, a nationwide outage in a power grid is a medium risk despite the
outage’s ability to inflict damage in the billions of dollars. Since swans, with their
huge impacts, tend to dominate the total risk of complex ICT systems, the use of risk
matrices has lead to a gross underestimation of the total risk associated with many
systems.
The underlying problem is that risk matrices of the type depicted in Fig. 2.3
implicitly assume that the distribution of the impact h(X) has a thin left tail. Since
the probabilities of nonrecurrent outliers or swans are assumed to be so small that
the incidents can be ignored, the risk matrix only represents recurrent incidents with
larger probabilities and smaller impacts than those of swans. However, a complex
adaptive ICT system with many tightly connected parts is very likely to have a h(X)
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Fig. 2.3 The five-level risk matrix underestimates the risk of gray swans
distribution with a thick left tail, making it dangerous to use the risk matrix in Fig. 2.3
because it excludes the possibility of swans.
2.7 Understanding and Reducing Risk
An interesting video exists (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MKcZtvwch1w) of
the late Peter L. Bernstein discussing risk. According to Bernstein, we talk about risk
when we do not know what will happen. Risk simply means that more things can
happen than will happen. Since this book focuses on swans incidents, we use a more
specific and narrow definition of risk. Consider a group of one or more stakeholders
with interests in a complex adaptive ICT system. We define the risk associated with
the group of stakeholders as the largest negative impact of all incidents that can
happen to the group during a fixed period. How the impact is actually measured
depends on the system and the interests of the stakeholders. Impact is commonly
measured in terms of financial loss. Note that our definition of risk is not based on
the probability of an incident. Because the definition of risk is tailored to the book’s
focus on intolerable incidents, it may not be the best choice in other settings.
Risk is a consequence of dependence [31]. A part (or system) X depends on
another part (system) Y if a failure in Y negatively affects the functionality of X .
The main sources of risk in an ICT system are the dependencies between its parts
creating positive feedback loops, which again cause local failures to propagate into
global failures. In general, the growing number of dependencies in increasingly
complex systems causes incidents impacting stakeholders to become less frequent,
because the systems become better at handling recurrent incidents over the normal
operating range. However, at the same time, the impacts of nonrecurrent incidents
are increasing due to the positive feedback loops propagating (combinations of) rare
local events outside the normal operating range.
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In Taleb’s [9] terminology, while incidents affecting stakeholders are becoming
less frequent, gray and black swans occur more often in ICT systems with tight
internal integration as their complexity grows. Since it is hard to determine all the
dependencies of complex systems, the probability of swans in complex ICT systems
is underestimated, causing intolerable impacts because most stakeholders are not
prepared for swans.
As the risk of recurrent incidents is reduced and the intervals between incidents
grow longer, the assumption that complex ICT systems are “safe” also grows, thus
causing a situation (actually a feedback loop) in which stakeholders create increas-
ingly more complex systems with tightly integrated parts [31]. To counter this devel-
opment and reduce the risks to the stakeholders, it is necessary to create ICT systems
with only tolerable failures. Since the causes of swans are, at best, hard to predict,
it is necessary to limit the impact of incidents, even though we have no a priori
knowledge of their causes.
2.8 Taleb’s Four Quadrants
Following Taleb [11, 12], we create a map to classify the negative impact of different
failures in complex adaptive ICT systems. We again represent the impact of events
in a complex adaptive ICT system by a continuous random variable with a particular
PDF. Furthermore, we discriminate between two types of negative impacts, namely,
local and global impacts. Some systems only permit the local impact of failures,
while other systems allow local failures to propagate and create a global (systemic)
impact. The PDF of the local or global impact has a thin or thick left tail.
The four quadrants of the map in Fig. 2.4 represent the four possible combinations
of local and global impacts and thin and thick tails. The quadrants represent four
classes of complex ICT systems with very different extreme behaviors. The map
shows where classical risk analysis works well and where it is of questionable use
Fig. 2.4 The impact of a failure in a complex adaptive ICT system falls within one of Taleb’s four
quadrants. The fourth quadrant must be avoided because it leads to intolerable systemic failures
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and can lead to the gross underestimation of the risk by ignoring swans in the form
of rare outliers with an intolerable negative impact.
A system in the first quadrant in Fig. 2.4 is very safe. It only experiences local
failures with limited impact because the PDF of the local impact has a thin left tail.
Unfortunately, it seems that today’s complex ICT systems are not in this quadrant.
The second quadrant is also a fairly safe place for a system. Global failures may
occur, but the global impact is tolerable due to the thin left tail of the PDF. Systems
in the third quadrant only experience local failures, but these can have a relatively
large impact because the PDF of the local impact has a thick left tail. Hence, rigorous
risk management is needed.
Systems in the fourth quadrant must be avoided because they are vulnerable to gray
and black swans with an intolerable impact. While the probability of a single swan
is small, ICT systems in the fourth quadrant are usually vulnerable to many swans,
making it inevitable that one will occur sooner or later. As explained in Sects. 2.3 and
2.6, classical risk analysis cannot handle nonrecurrent swans in the fourth quadrant.
We want to develop and operate complex adaptive ICT systems where all failures
are local with limited impact, that is, we want the systems to fall in the first quadrant
in Fig. 2.4. However, since we will not succeed in limiting absolutely all failures
of complex national and international ICT infrastructures, these systems will more
likely end up in the second or third quadrant, which is also acceptable as long as we
avoid swans with an intolerable impact in the fourth quadrant.
2.9 Discussion and Summary
If we consider a complex adaptive ICT system over a period of, say, 20 years, then
normal incidents will occur repeatedly during the period. Hence, these recurrent
incidents should become less and less surprising to the system’s stakeholders. The
same is not true for gray and black swans. Because swans are so rare, they will not
occur multiple times over the considered period. Consequently, swans are, at best,
very hard to predict, since there is little or nothing in the system’s history to signal
their future occurrence. However, since complex ICT systems are vulnerable to many
swans, the probability that at least one swan will occur is too large to be ignored.
Given a set of stakeholders, a complex ICT system is fragile to a particular type
of negative impact if a possible large impact is unacceptable to some stakeholders
in the set and robust if all possible impacts are acceptable to all stakeholders. It is
not enough for complex ICT systems to be robust, because internal and external
changes fragilize complex systems over time, making them increasingly vulnerable
to large-impact events, including swans. Since we cannot hope to predict all negative
events that can significantly impact complex ICT systems, we must build systems that
limit the impact of incidents of unknown origin and learn from events with a small
negative impact how to limit the impact of all incidents. The resulting ICT systems
are anti-fragile when they manage to reduce and maintain acceptable impacts to all
stakeholders.
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Stochastic modeling is much used in many research areas, particularly in modern
financial theory. Financial models are very often based on PDFs with thin tails, lead-
ing to a gross underestimation of the risks associated with the economic processes
being modeled. To better understand the devastating consequences of using the wrong
stochastic models, the reader should consult the books of Pablo Triana [39] and
Benoit Mandelbrot and Richard Hudson [40]. Both argue that standard financial
models have led investors to take on huge hidden risks with ruinous consequences.
Together, Taleb [8–11], Triana, Mandelbrot, and Hudson illustrate the folly of trying
to predict extreme global behavior in complex adaptive systems of global importance.
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